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I

n October 2001, then-Secretary of State Colin Powell addressed a conference
of humanitarian nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in Washington,
D.C. There, he remarked “I want you to know that I have made it clear to my
staff here and to all of our ambassadors around the world that I am serious about
making sure we have the best relationship with the NGOs who are such a force
multiplier for us, such an important part of our combat team.”1 Although his
purpose in this address was undoubtedly to build a foundation for a whole-ofnation effort to promote democracy, respect for human rights, and the elimination
of terrorism, the secretary’s speech had the opposite effect, angering many of
the conference’s participants who felt that the US Government was seeking to
co-opt their organizations by making them mere ancillaries to the war effort.
In 2006 to 2007, Army Lieutenant Colonel James L. Cook was the CJ3
(Deputy for Plans and Operations) for Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) 76,
covering Regional Command (RC) South and RC East in Afghanistan. His
command controlled most of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), and
all of the American PRTs operating in those areas of responsibility. Troubling
to LTC Cook was the level of redundancy of aid and assistance programs
undertaken by the military, government agencies, and the NGO community.
He was confused as to why: “as operators, it was so difficult to get everyone
to row together” and divide responsibilities to most efficiently and effectively
use the limited resources at hand.2 Although he found levels of access to and
cooperation with NGOs varied from project to project and NGO to NGO, Cook
felt area-wide communication and cooperation were less than he thought possible and NGOs were (largely) unresponsive to his staff’s efforts to streamline
the distribution of reconstruction and aid monies.
Solomon Major is an analyst at the US Navy War College, Strategic Research
Department/National Security Affairs Department. Before coming to the War College,
Dr. Major instructed at the University of California, Santa Barbara. He received his Ph.D.
from Stanford University and a Master’s from Georgetown University. He has published
articles on humanitarian NGOs, international economic sanctions, and ethnic conflict.
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Introduction
Like most military and foreign policy professionals, Secretary Powell
and LTC Cook have a genuine interest in helping those in need. Alleviating
suffering is not their only interest however. The Departments of State and
Defense are arms of the United States government and are thus responsible to
the nation and its people for advancing their interests as well as for meeting the
needs of those affected by tragedy. Indeed, there is a hierarchy of interests that
are served by government-sponsored humanitarian missions. First, advance the
goals of the nation, and, second, deliver aid to those in need. There is nothing
cynical or hypocritical about this hierarchy. As the previous passages reflect,
rather than seeing these national and humanitarian ends as conflicting, both
Secretary Powell and LTC Cook believed these two goals were in harmony—
one supports the other.
As the respect for human rights and dignity from policy practitioners is
genuine, they believe their common cause with their humanitarian NGO counterparts should serve as a basis for a smooth and unproblematic partnership. True,
the humanitarians might not share their hierarchy of interests, as the latter may
privilege the interests of those in need of aid above the interests of the nations
that deliver it. But, as the government practitioner sees no conflict between
serving these two interests, this fact ought not disrupt prospects for cooperation.
The continued unevenness in civil-military relations between militaries and
nongovernmental aid-givers, sometimes cooperative, often uncooperative (even
hostile), thus continues to confuse and frustrate government agents.
In fact, the root of such problems stem from the fact that many in the
policy community fail to appreciate that humanitarians also have a hierarchy of
interests. Humanitarians have historically been as concerned with humanitarianism as an end as much as a means, because the practice of humanitarianism
redeems the aid-giver as much as it comforts the recipient—or, more precisely,
the aid-giver is redeemed through providing comfort to others.3 Implicitly, this
means there is a hierarchy of interests among nongovernmental aid-givers.
First, advance the humanitarian project, and, second, use the project to deliver
aid to those in need. As a result, the humanitarian community defines itself in
terms of not only its humanitarian mission, but also that of its core principles:
independence (from nation states), neutrality (between parties to a conflict),
and impartiality (with respect to the recipients of aid). These ideals and principals underlie the idea of an apolitical “humanitarian space” that is necessarily
free from politics. There is nothing sinister or hypocritical in this perspective,
however, as, like the government agent, humanitarians see their goals as being
in harmony rather than in conflict: “right action” on behalf of the aid-giver
advances the interests of the recipient and the humanitarian project.
This article argues the tension between these often unacknowledged
hierarchies is at the heart of a similar tension between the two communities
of aid-givers, with both seeking to provide humanitarian assistance to those
in need. It considers the origins and implications of the differing priorities
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each gives to their organizational and “humanitarian” objectives. In the latter
portions of the article, divisions within the NGO community are explored. It is
at this juncture the argument is made that these divisions might be exploited by
military aid-givers to more effectively partner with their civilian opposites—
though only when the conditions are favorable. The article will conclude by
noting that when both the humanitarian and government agents serve the interests of the recipients, in part, the commonality of interest and the prospects
for cooperation do indeed exist. The difficulty, however, lies between these
two communities in their mutual incompatibility regarding the other interests
each community serves: for the government professional, the nation-state is
an intrinsically political construct and, for the humanitarian, the principles of
humanitarianism are necessarily apolitical (even antipolitical) projects.

Know Thyself and My… Ally?
The great Chinese military philosopher Sun Tzu argued success in
battle required that one know himself and those against whom one fights.
With due respect to Sun Tzu, he perhaps forgot to mention the importance of
understanding one’s allies as well. This is particularly important in the case of
humanitarian aid, where the fractious alliance relations between governmental
and nongovernmental actors can be just as great an obstacle to success as their
common enemy: disaster and its depredations.

Serving the Nation
As noted earlier, military and diplomatic officials (to include the United
States Agency for International Development [USAID], etc.) self-consciously
act to realize a hierarchy of goals. When government agents undertake
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) missions, their immediate
concern is for those in need of help. This mission is nested within a broader
one of advancing the nation’s policy goals, though they do not perceive—or
even accept—that these goals could be contradictory.4 For example, during
Operation Unified Assistance, which delivered aid to the victims of the 2004
Asian tsunami, the US Navy saw no contradiction between its genuine desire to
assist those in humanitarian distress and a parallel tendency to expound on the
“huge publicity coup for the Navy.”5 For the Navy, the humanitarian aspect of
HA/DR operations is political because the Navy serves a political master—the
nation state.
The success of the mission undertaken will be evaluated against the
goals of advancing the nation’s interests and delivering material aid to those
in need. For example, when those involved in Unified Assistance went out of
their way to ensure their activities were not perceived as “inappropriate” by
Indonesian Muslims, this probity was largely due to the desire to ensure efficient
and effective distribution of humanitarian relief rather than a commitment to
behave “properly.” While this consequentialist logic has a common-sense ring
to it, it is not the only way one might consider and weigh individual actions. A
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failure to appreciate the fact that others privilege more than just results can be
the first step in creating misunderstandings between communities; such acts
can make relations tense and cooperation problematic.

The Humanitarian Ethos
Contrary to any military or civilian governmental ethos, the defining
principles of humanitarianism, as articulated by the International Committee
of the Red Cross (ICRC), are: humanity, impartiality, neutrality, independence, voluntary service, unity, and universality. Note that all of these demand
“proper” motivation on behalf of aid-givers while none concerns the ends that
might otherwise inform a logic of consequence. On the other hand, the apolitical nature of humanitarian principles have encouraged a logic of appropriate
action. Indeed, as late as “the 1990s, [humanitarian] aid agencies rarely contemplated whether their actions did more harm than good—they presumed that
good intentions were evidence of good outcomes.”6
Contrary to those who think civilian NGOs just “don’t get” the benefits
of cooperation with the military and other political actors, humanitarians do, in
fact, recognize the ability to deliver aid more efficiently through such cooperation. But these organizations fear that doing so risks the ideal of a humanitarian
space and threatens to overwhelm it with the interests and priorities of nations
and other political actors. The importance of “good works from which the
doer might also benefit,”7 combined with the ethics of humanity, impartiality,
neutrality, independence, voluntary service, unity, and universality have led
humanitarians to see their mission from a different perspective than that of the
professional soldier. Soldiers, like Cook, believe that if only they could communicate more effectively to their humanitarian NGO partners that they were,
in fact, seeking the same ends, they could ease resistance. Yet this divide cannot
be bridged solely through strategic communication because in reality these
differences stem from fundamentally different perspectives rather than from
any miscommunication. For example, where government agents welcome the
cooperation and input of nongovernmental aid-givers, insofar as it helps them
achieve their goals, humanitarians fear such interactions threaten to subvert and
corrupt the apolitical principles of humanitarianism.
These perspectives not only support the humanitarians’ principled
resistance to the government’s encroachment into their “space,” but also, on a
more fundamental yet subtle level, influence how humanitarians perceive the
role of aid and its success quite different from that of the military professional.
The military professional focuses on the outcomes (consequence) of his actions,
the humanitarian professional focuses on their intent (appropriateness). For
example, one of the most effective and efficient distributors of aid to post-Katrina
New Orleans was retail giant Wal-Mart. Yet humanitarians were concerned that
for-profit companies’ distributions of aid, no matter how efficient, undermined
the “morality” of that aid.8 In fact, humanitarian scholar Janice Gross Stein
wrote “the meaning of effectiveness defined within the conceptual architecture
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of ‘outcome’ is bitterly contested among humanitarians . . . . accountability
defined as effectiveness forces a discussion about consequence [which at] its
most extreme can substitute a logic—and an ethic—of consequence for an ethic
of obligation.” Stein continues by noting that such “a consequentialist logic
would argue that humanitarians should only give assistance when it is effective,
irrespective of where it is needed,” a proposition they bitterly contest.9

Molehills are not Mountains
The differences between humanitarians and their military and civilian government counterparts are wide indeed; however, it is easy to overstate
their differences. For example, although military professionals (rightly) pride
themselves on their bottom-line, consequentialist logic, it is likely even they
would admit to being morally constrained because of personal and professional
codes of appropriate conduct. Although the Army’s latest Posture Statement
says the Army must win the nation’s wars “decisively and dominantly,”10 there
are few Army officers who would seriously consider the use of chemical or
nuclear weapons—even if doing so would more efficiently fight and win the
nation’s wars.
Equally, humanitarians do care deeply that their actions benefit those
in their care. In their case, the humanitarian ethos is deemed not only appropriate but also necessary for the effective delivery of aid—as can be attested to by
the number of murdered and kidnapped humanitarians, often the result of their
being “politicized” by their association with warring parties.11 Humanitarians
are often under threat from their too-close cooperation with the military, and
their access to the people they seek to help is impacted. This is often the case
when parties to a conflict refuse entry to humanitarians who cooperate too
closely with one side, thereby preventing them from accomplishing the material
ends they seek.12
Finally, not all aid-givers are created equal. The aid community is
far from monolithic and its members’ commitment to appropriate action and
pure humanitarianism versus a more pragmatic approach is as varied as the
organizations and individuals therein. Members of the aid community who
tread this fine line on the side of desired ends may be the best partners for the
military professional.

A House Divided Against Itself
All aid is not alike. Although the aid community can be divided
a number of ways, one critical distinction is between humanitarianism and
development aid. Although the military lumps the two together by designating
assistance missions as “HA/DR,” humanitarianism and development have very
different meanings for those within the NGO community. In considering divisions within the NGO ranks, Michael Barnett, a leading NGO scholar, develops
the useful distinction between “alchemical” and “emergency” aid agencies, one
that is borrowed here. Barnett writes:
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Emergency humanitarianism concerns the provision of relief to those
in immediate peril; cleaves to neutrality, impartiality, and independence; and has a hands-off attitude toward politics. Agencies that fall
into this camp include the ICRC and MSF [Médecins Sans Frontières/
Doctors Without Borders]. Agencies that fall into this camp focus on
keeping people alive. Nothing More . . . . Alchemical humanitarianism involves saving lives at risk and addressing the root causes of
suffering; operates with a less binding set of principles; and treats
politics as necessary and at times even a welcome feature in humanitarian action . . . . Although it is fashionable to call humanitarians the
new missionaries, it is more accurate to call them the new alchemists,
given their attempt to harness the science of the day to transform
social, political, economic, and cultural relations so that individuals
can lead more productive, healthy, and dignified lives.13

Alchemical Aid
Developmental, or alchemical, aid agencies, particularly those based in
the United States, have had a long historical relationship working with governments. Such partnerships permit each party to achieve their primary, if often
unacknowledged, goals—advancing states’ interests and delivering opportunities for grace through altruistic service for the NGOs—while staying true to
their objective to help those in need. Alchemist NGOs continue to be tightly
linked to projects directly funded by government and intergovernmental organizations, such as the World Bank and the United Nations.
While this tradition of cooperation (or codependence) has a long history,
it does not ensure a smooth and cooperative relationship. Perhaps counterintuitively, alchemist NGOs’ willingness to be political has, at times, made them
more antimilitary than the emergency NGOs, who believe their role is best
served by avoiding politics entirely. Notwithstanding, both alchemical NGOs
and their governmental and military counterparts have substantial incentives
to sublimate this antagonism, especially when they interact in the course of
humanitarian crises.
When operating in emergency situations, the military professional has
a number of tools available to smooth these relationships. The first, and perhaps
the most important, is brute power. In terms of what the military can bring to
the fight, the military has logistical, planning, and intelligence assets that dwarf
those of even the best-resourced humanitarian organizations. Often, much of
the initial disinclination to cooperate with the military by various NGOs is
overcome when the latter find they need the type and depth of support that
only the military can provide. But marriages of convenience rarely last and
less often do they satisfy both parties. In order for a more consistent and effective manner of cooperation to be realized, a foundation built on more precise
objectives is desirable, even if accomplishing all the outlined objectives is not
always possible.
One possibility concerns the military’s desire to leave crisis zones
once the more immediate task of saving those faced with the threat of dying is
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accomplished. Even the most ardent opponents of military-sponsored humanitarianism admit that “[a]rmies can play a role in providing relief, especially in
peacetime and natural disasters”—provided that they leave when the crisis has
passed.14 But effectively communicating this convergence of interests is not
always a simple one. In this context, the message contained in strategic communication can be an issue, and often dependent on who delivers the message.
For example, USAID’s Disaster Assistance Response Teams (DARTs) often
serve as an invaluable liaison between military and NGO actors, given the fact
that representatives of each are often found in the other’s camp and thus have a
degree of mutual understanding.15 In the case of direct NGO-military interaction, for example, when Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations (PSYOP)
teams, along with Public Affairs officers, interact, there is often more common
ground than when other specialty officers such as Judge Advocate Generals
(JAGs) are employed.16 Still, should the military become overly attached to the
optimistic opinion that cooperation is simply a matter of getting their “message”
out, it is important to remember the difference between NGOs and their military
counterparts is often more fundamental than just an inability to communicate.

Emergency Aid
Although the growing commitment of moving from help to self-help, from
emergency to alchemical aid, has been welcomed by many, humanitarian traditionalists decry the politicization and bureaucratization of humanitarianism
this entails. While the ICRC is seen by many as the epitome of the ideal emergency response organization, the resistance to this belief has been nowhere
stronger or more militant than in what Volker Heins terms sans-frontièrisme,
referring to the “Without Borders” movements (such movements include MSF
and Reporters Without Borders, Engineers Without Borders, and even Geeks
Without Borders).17 These activists argue the humanitarian’s stance must be
overtly apolitical.18 Indeed, according to one MSF official:
It is simply not possible for a government or military to have the
unconditional ambition of only providing humanitarian action. Our
objectives are fundamentally different from those of the military . . . .
We understand that aid supplied by military forces can provide relief to
people in need as can acts of assistance provided by individual soldiers
or units moved by a sense of humanity. But this aid is different. It is not
humanitarian assistance. It is given as a reward.19

Not surprisingly, and unlike alchemical aid-givers, these emergency
organizations have sought to limit or even deny government funding, worrying
that the taint by association would undermine their independence. NGOmilitary relations are made even more difficult by the fact that the private
donor base these organizations cultivate are often composed of individuals
who hold antistate and antimilitary perspectives. A failure to observe the difference between the alchemists, whose embrace of the political allows for the
possibility of cooperation, and the emergency humanitarians, whose rejection
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of the political does not, is at the root of much of the confusion by government
representatives regarding their relationships within the NGO community.
A lack of appreciation for the differences between alchemical and
emergency NGOs forms the basis for another, rarely appreciated, source of
conflict between emergency aid-givers and the military: the role of aid in civil
rights advocacy—in favor of women, workers, etc. According to the emergency
aid-givers, actively advocating rights may actually be antithetical to the practice of humanitarianism, as the former is necessarily political while the latter is
not. The committed emergency humanitarian certainly does not wish to strip
aid recipients of their rights. While he might value human rights, and even
allow that political actors, such as the military, might be among the legitimate
guarantors of these rights, actively trying to provide them in their role as a
humanitarian often demands too much in terms of political engagement.
In the end, the intransigence and hostility encountered by those seeking
to work with emergency humanitarians is not necessarily because of the humanitarian’s antipathy for the military or government or the political objectives they
pursue. Rather, it is because these emergency aid-givers see humanitarianism,
as defined by specific actions, as necessarily incommensurate with individuals
and organizations bound to serve political entities. Understanding the fundamental basis for the friction between the military and aid communities is
critical if we are to overcome these differences. Essentially, from the emergency perspective, as opposed to the more pragmatic and malleable alchemical
viewpoint, the fact that states may render aid does not necessarily mean that
such aid is humanitarian in the strictest sense of the term. Emergency aidgivers see such aid as axiomatic based on the fact that states cannot be seen as
humanitarians and thus the military’s use of the “H” in HA/DR is undermining
the very understanding of the humanitarian project.

Conclusion: A New Strategy for Engagement
This article has argued that the tension between military professionals and humanitarians is not only one of ideology but also one of hierarchies
of organizational interests and meaning. Although both sides claim to value
similar objectives—easing pain and suffering—their contrary approaches
determine that their ways of obtaining those goals will often be in conflict.
While these differences are stark in theory, representing binaries between the
political and the humanitarian, the actual differences between the soldier and
the humanitarian is very often much less dramatic in actual execution. Perhaps
the main reason for this fact is the variety of NGO aid providers, each having
different levels of fealty to the ideals of “pure” humanitarianism. While some
alchemists, especially developmentalists and rights advocates, are willing to
become politically engaged, and thus may be willing to compromise with soldiers and politicians, others, especially emergency aid-givers, will continue to
shun engagement with government agencies and their representatives.
With an interest in the development of military professionals in a world
increasingly impacted by humanitarian concerns and the NGOs that support
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them, this article concludes with several observations that might be helpful
when the military and NGOs interact in the future.
•• Beware of Hidden Hierarchies: Given the commitment of the humanitarian organization to the personal salvation of the aid-giver, the needs of the
NGO often take on greater importance in the day-to-day concerns of the giver.
Likewise, the military professional understands that his duty is to his country,
but it is generally accepted that aiding others is a critical part of service to the
nation. Soldiers and civilian humanitarians thus have issues that bring them
together as well as force them apart. By focusing only on areas of common
interest, military professionals often underestimate the potential for friction in
these relationships while they may overestimate the likelihood for cooperation.
A more balanced and sensitive approach is critical in aligning expectations
with reality.
•• Logics: Separate but Equal? The military professional needs to realize
that just because they value a logic that places ends ahead of means, this does
not imply that everyone else does. This is not to say the soldier should think like
the humanitarian, nor even accept the humanitarian’s hierarchy of interests, but
rather the soldier should be cognizant of the potential pitfalls he faces—even
from those he believes share his goals.
•• Human Rights and Humanitarianism Are Not the Same: It is common to
think that humanitarianism and human rights are the same. But they are not the
same, with many humanitarians ill at ease with the political and social engineering required to ensure that these human rights are maintained. It is critical for
the military professional to be cognizant of the goals of the various NGOs with
whom he is working—are they humanitarian; are they developmental; are they
rights-oriented? Answering these questions (or even being aware that they need
to be asked) is a critical first step in developing a work strategy with NGOs.
•• Not All NGOs are Alike: NGOs can be divided into several categories, with
each demonstrating some aspect of their willingness and ability to work with
various state agents, along with their commitment to logic of appropriateness
and consequence. This article has focused on two in particular: humanitarian
vs. developmental and alchemical vs. emergency. There are, however, other
distinctions that may be important and should be considered. For example,
country-of-origin can have an impact, as American NGOs generally do not
feel as strong a requirement to defend their independence in the same manner
as European NGOs. Likewise, knowing an organization’s willingness to accept
government contracts is another way to categorize organizations and evaluate
their prospects for cooperation.
•• Context Matters: Finally, in the past, humanitarian organizations have been
“. . . quick to accuse donor governments of politicizing humanitarian action, but
much slower in defining more precisely what kind of political intervention would
be desirable.”20 Even this indeterminacy has a tendency to change in response to
developments in the field. For example, Afghanistan and Iraq, where not even the
Red Cross or Red Crescent are immune from attack, humanitarians have little or
no alternative but to cooperate with members of the host government and various
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foreign powers, to include the military and private security firms. Furthermore,
because state interests are often only tangentially engaged in cases of natural
disasters (as opposed to wars and man-made disasters), humanitarian organizations may be more willing to sanction their participation—and even cooperate
with these organizations. For example, following the 2004 Asian Tsunami even
MSF (often reluctantly) worked hand-in-hand with the US Navy. But when state
interests become engaged, even in the most peripheral manner, as was the case
with the United States’ involvement in Haiti after the 2010 earthquake, humanitarians will again be wary of working too closely with the military or diplomatic
representatives. Thus, when considering the prospects for NGO-military cooperation, the military professional needs to consider the nature of the crisis, the
type of NGO, and critically evaluate both, not only through the lens of consequence, but also with a thought as to appropriateness. With these considerations
in mind, the military and diplomatic representative may more effectively and
efficiently achieve their ends—with or without the assistance and cooperation of
their NGO counterparts.
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